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The Binary and the Potential 
in Roland Barthes's Concept of the Neutral 
Sota Kanaya 
1. Introduction: Barthes's concept of the Neutral 
In 1977, Roland Barthes inaugurated the chair of Semiologie Litteraire at the College 
de France. "The Neutral" (Ie Neutre) is the title of his second series of courses at the 
College (from February to June 1978), and the text of this course was published in 
2002.1 The Neutral is a key concept for better understanding Barthes's later years, that 
is to say Barthes as an "artist-professor" (professeur-artiste, to borrow the term from 
Thomas Clerc, editor of The Neutra0.2 
At the same time, the theme of the Neutral was not confined to this course.3 Indeed, 
we can see this theme in Barthes's various texts. For example, the Neutral is 
represented as degree zero in Writing Deg,'ee Zero (Ie Degre zero de l'ecritul'e [1953]), 
as an attempt to suspend the system of meaning by means of analyzing the mythical 
value of signs in Mythologies (1957), in the question of "transgression" of the binary 
order (Barthes's analyses of narrative, above all S/Z (1970) and his analysis of Edgar 
Allan Poe's text4) , in the "third meaning" (troisieme sens) that cannot be classified as 
paradigmatic order (the "obtuse meaning" [sens obtus] of visual images),5 and so on. 
The reason this concept of the Neutral entails such a wide range of applications for 
Barthes's analyses is that Barthes himself gave a very flexible definition of the Neutral, 
as discussed in the next section. In his course on the Neutral, Barthes dealt with 
diverse "figures" as possible appearances of the Neutral ("Benevolence," "Weariness," 
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"Silence," and so on) without any conclusive synthesis. These facts show us that the 
Neutral is nothing but an evasive concept that is resistant to be theorized. 
The publication of Barthes's course on the Neutral reinforced the importance of this 
concept. In fact, it leads us not only to the relationship bet\veen Barthes and Maurice 
Blanchot6 but also to references on contemporary thought, for example, Emmanuel 
Levinas's notion of "otherness" (alterite).7 In addition, before the publication of this 
course, Bernard Comment had already dealt with the different themes of Barthes's 
texts in which the Neutral can be detected (theory of text, morality, photography, and 
so on).8 However, little attention has been given to Barthes's binary thought itself (or 
precisely speaking, its theoretical basis) despite the fact that it is a prerequisite for his 
conceptualization of the Neutral. 
This paper approaches the core of Barthes's concept of the Neutral by linking his 
course on it to his theoretical text in the 1960s. First, we clarify Barthes's own 
particular vision of the paradigm on which his concept of the Neutral is based. Second, 
we examine its theoretical basis. Finally, we show that Bar.thes's principle of delicacy, 
as a way to demonstrate the Neutral, is closely connected to the relationship bet\veen 
the binary and the potential. 
2. The system of meaning and the Neutral 
The Neutral (le Neutre) is derived from Latin neuter \vhich means "neither of the 
two" (aucun des deux).9 Barthes defines it as follows: 
I define the Neutral as that which outplays the paradigm, or rather I call Neutral 
everything that baffles the paradigm .... 
The paradigm, what is that? It's the opposition of t\vo virtual terms from which, 
in speaking, I actualize one to produce meaning .... 
Whence the idea of a structural creation that would defeat, annul, or contradict 
the implacable binarism of the paradigm by means of a third term ... In structural 
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linguistics, Hjelmslev, Bmndal, and phoneticians: AlB ---j. A + B (complex) and 
neither A nor B: amorphous, neutral term (phonological neutralization), or zero 
degree. (The Neutral 6-7: 31) 
The Neutral "outplays" or "baffles" (dejouer) the paradigm. It also indicates a 
specific status pertaining to the binary order ("binarism"), namely linguistic 
"neutralization." Barthes explains that, under the particular condition, the binary 
opposition phonologically (for example, in French /)o£sson [pwa.s5J (fish) and /)o£son 
[pwaz5J (poison)) or semantically (white/black) loses its "relevance" (perhnence). This 
means that, on account of his conceptualization of the Neutral, Barthes deals with the 
opposition at the same time, both phonologically (poisson/poison) and semantically 
(white/black). 
On the one hand, as Barthes notes, in principle, the paradigm consists of potential 
terms ("the opposition of two virtual terms"). In this sense, the paradigm cannot be 
reduced to the relation of opposition since it involves the relation of similarity (for 
example, see/watch/observe). Barthes deliberately pays attention to the characteristic 
of paradigm as a gathering of potential terms. On the other hand, in order to produce 
meaning, one of them needs to be actualized in the spoken chain. In this case, the 
important aspect of the paradigm as potential terms (so to speak, its potentiality) 
withdraws to the background, for what is at stake, seems to be whether one of them is 
actualized or not, in other words present or absent. This, then, is obviously the binary 
thought. In this way, we can perceive the paradigm as a binary system. One might well 
suppose that binary oppositions generally take forms such as white/black, high/low, 
and nature/culture. However, the opposition between presence and absence is also 
binary. 
In fact, Barthes focuses on the "choice" of potential terms. The act of choice is 
founded on the binary thought: 
... the paradigm is the wellspring of meaning; where there is meaning, there is 
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paradigm, and where there is paradigm (opposition), there is meaning ... meaning 
rests on conflict (the choice of one term against another), and all conflict is 
generative of meaning .... (The Neutral 7: 31) 
The choice of meaning is bound to the notion of conflict to the extent that the former 
is "the choice of one term against another" (Ie choix d'un tenne contre l'autre). In this 
sense, we can say that the paradigm as a "wellspring" (ressort) of meaning depends on 
the relation of opposition. This opposition is nothing but the binary relation between 
one term and another. Barthes also describes it as follows: "to choose one and refuse 
the other" (choisir un et rejJousser autre) (Ibid., italics by Barthes). Though we need to 
draw attention to whether the term "autre" means "another" or "the other" (vle return 
to this in the next section), here it is sufficient to confirm the importance of the act of 
choice. 
The notion of paradigm in question is therefore the system of opposition (based on 
binary thought) rather than the one of similarity. Moreover, Barthes adds an ethical 
value to this system of meaning: 
... injunctions addressed by the world to "choose," to produce meaning, to enter 
conflicts, to "take responsibility," etc. --...-,. temptation to suspend, to thwart, to elude 
the paradigm, its menacing pressure, its arrogance --...-,. to exempt meaning --...-,. this 
polymol1)hous field of paradigm, of conflict avoidance = the Neutral. (The Neutral 
7: 32) 
We can see that at the level of ethics the paradigm contains a negative value as 
"anogance," because the system of meaning forces us to choose one of its potential tenns. 
For Barthes, it is crucially important to become free of the notion of opposition that 
concerns both linguistic systems and social relations. The Neutral appears as the avoidance 
of anogance in which we can see Barthes's well-known theme, "exemption of meaning."l0 
On the whole, through his course, Barthes describes the Neutral not only as what he 
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calls "nuance," namely the "difference," vlhich cannot be reduced to binary oppositions, 
but also as a phenomenon that suspends the system of meaning as well as the 
arrogance of social relations. 
3. Paradigm, binarism, and neutralization 
As we have seen, Barthes regarded the paradigm as a relation of an opposition 
based on binary thought. Hovvever, we must reconsider whether the paradigm can be 
reduced to the relation of opposition, or precisely speaking, we need to focus on 
Barthes's theoretical basis of his own vision of paradigm. To do so, we refer to 
Barthes's Elements of Semiology (1964).11 In this text, Barthes explains the notion of 
paradigm as follows: 
The system constitutes the second axis of the language. Saussure has seen it in 
the shape of a series of associative fields, some determined by an affinity of sound 
(education, saturation), some by an affinity in meaning (education, ujJbn:nging). 
Each field is a store of potential terms (since only one of them is actualized in the 
present discourse) .... The terms of the field (or paradigm) must at the same time 
be similar and dissimilar, include a common and a variable element: this is the 
case on the plane of the signifier, vlith education and saturation, and on the plane 
of the signified with education and upbringiJ'lg. (Italics by Barthes, Elements of 
Semiology 71-72: 681-682) 
In using Ferdinand de Saussure's terminology, "associative fields" (champs 
associatlfs), Barthes describes the paradigm (whereas paradigm is one of the axes of 
language, another axis is, of course, syntagm or the spoken chain) as a "store of 
potential terms" (nisel've de tennes virtuels). These potential terms are classified in the 
system of paradigm to the extent that they have both resemblance with and difference 
from one another, not only at the level of sound ("education" and "saturation") but also 
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at the level of content ("education" and "upbringing"). The notion of paradigm 
indicates potential differences (and resemblances) of language. Barthes's vision of 
paradigm is therefore devoted to Saussure's linguistic heritage.12 
What kind of view on the binarism has Barthes taken then? It is in this point that the 
link beh:veen paradigm and binarism is revealed: 
... Saussure himself never did conceive the associative field as binary .... It is 
phonology which has focused attention on the binarism of language (only at the 
level of the second articulation, it is true) ... according to him [Roman Jakobson], 
the phonetic systems of all languages could be described by means of a dozen 
distinctive features, all of them binary, that is to say, either present or absent, or, 
as the case may be, irrelevant. (l!-1ements of Semiology 81-82: 689-690) 
In shifting attention from Saussure's terminology to phonology, Barthes explains 
that the phonetic system depends on the binary principle in the sense that each 
"distinctive feature" (trait distinctij) is present or absent. At the same time, it is 
necessary to keep in mind that as Barthes notes, the binary principle serves as a basis 
of the paradigm "only at the level of the second articulation," that is to say at the level 
of the phoneme. Barthes deliberately notes that "the universality of binarism is not 
certain" (Elements of Semiology 82: 690). 
Nevertheless, the binary model of phonology has a great influence on Barthes's 
thought of the relation of opposition. For instance, the opposition between biere (beer) 
and pierre (stone) shows the fact that "an approximate sound between band p cannot 
in any way refer to an intermediate substance between beer and stone; ... the 
opposition is still [toujours] in the all-or-nothing category" (italics by Barthes, Elements 
of Semiology 74: 684). The "all-or-nothing category" (nigime du tout ou rien) obviously 
indicates the difference between presence and absence. The opposition between biere 
and pierre depends on the presence or absence of "mark," that is to say in this case, the 
presence or absence of voice as distinctive feature. 
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The basis of binarism therefore consists of the difference between presence and 
absence. The "privative oppositions" correspond to the differences based on "mark" 
(marked/unmarked opposition). Vye also need to draw attention to another type of 
opposition. The oppositions such as white/black and high/low are called "equipollent 
oppositions" whose logic in principle differs from privative oppositions ("equipollent 
oppositions," have nothing to do with the presence or absence of a mark).13 
However, what is essential here is that these oppositions are subsumed into the 
binary principle in the sense that they rest on the relations of two terms. The 
oppositions in question, whether privative or equipollent, are the relations between two 
terms. Thus, whenever Barthes problematizes the paradigm in order to seek the 
Neutral, we need to pay attention to the fact that the relation of two terms has an 
important role as a prerequisite for his conceptualization of the Neutral. 
Barthes's vision of paradigm is, as we saw in the previous section, closely connected 
with the "choice" of potential terms (according to Jakobson's terminology, the 
"selection" of terms). The choice of meaning is founded on the binary principle, since 
the presence of one term ineluctably accompanies the absence of others. Here, as a 
matter of fact, we face the relation of one versus other (in other words, the presence or 
absence of a term). Barthes's vision of paradigm depends on the relation of this one 
versus other whose binary principle is applied not only to the phonetic system 
(presence or absence of distinctive features) but also to the choice of terms (presence or 
absence of terms). 
Thus, as far as the "choice" of potential terms is in question, the binary principle can 
be symbolized as the relation one versus other that includes some variants, that is to 
say, one term versus another (for example, see versus watch), one term versus the other 
(she versus he 14) , one term versus some others (see versus watch, stare, observe, etc.), 
and one term versus the others (see versus watch, observe, she, sea, etc.). 
Indeed, we can see that the relation of one versus other appears in Barthes's 
description of the notion of "neutralization": 
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... in French, there is normally an opposition between e [e] and e [s] when one of 
these terms is at the end of a word (j'aimai / j'aimais); this opposition ceases to be 
relevant anywhere else: it is neutralized .... In this case the two neutralized 
features are reunited under a single sound which is called archiphoneme, and 
which is written with a capital letter: e / e = E .... 
.... Fashion, ... which has polysemic (and even pansemic) tendencies, admits 
numerous neutralizations: whereas in one case chandail [pullover sweater] refers 
back to the seaside, and sweater [cardigan sweater] to the mountains, in another 
case it will be possible to speak of a chandail ou un sweater [sic] for the seaside; 
the relevance chandail/ sweater is lost: the two pieces are absorbed into a kind of 
'archi-vesteme' of the 'woollen' type. (Italics by Barthes, Elements of Sem,iology 83-
84: 691) 
Phonologic and semiologic oppositions consist of two terms (e. g., j'aimai / j'aimais, 
chandail / sweater). Although it is possible that neutralization occurs in the case of 
more than two phonemes, in Barthes's explanation, the model of oppositions is the 
relation of two terms, that is to say the relation of one versus other. The notion of 
neutralization here means that binary oppositions (temporarily) lose their relevance, in 
other words, they are made to be (temporarily) canceled. In this way, phonologic 
neutralization is applied to the field of fashion (this semiologic application is, of course, 
connected with Barthes's well-known analysis of fashion discourse published in 1967, 
namely The Fashion System [Systeme de la mode]). 
Furthermore, it is important that neutralization, whether phonologic or semiologic, 
accompanies a certain category (in this case, archiphoneme and "archi-vesteme," the 
latter is Barthes's neologism). Neutralized elements are subsumed into this kind of type. 
Indeed, "archi-vesteme" is especially described as a class of clothing ("a kind of 'archi-
vesteme' of the 'woollen' type"). It is in this point that we can see a relation based on 
categories, that is to say the conceptual link between the upper class and its 
subcategories, for pullover and cardigan both belong to the sweater class of clothing. 
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This sort of relation (the relation between genre and espece) supports neutralization to 
the extent that a certain abstract class conceptually includes neutralized elements. 
Thus, it seems that the conceptual link between the upper class and its subcategories 
allows us to approach the core of Barthes's concept of the Neutral. In the next section, 
we return to his course on the Neutral and discuss this point. 
4. The potential and the Principe de delicatesse 
From the beginning of his course on the Neutral, Barthes was well aware of the 
difficulty of conceptualizing this theme. As we have seen in the second section, the 
Neutral in principle not only cannot be classified into the system of meaning but also 
resists the arrogance of social relations. The Neutral as sidestepping the paradigm, 
once emerging clearly, would take a risk of being reduced to paradigmatic ideas. For 
instance, if we attempt to theorize the Neutral in relation to arrogance, we cannot help 
postulating a paradigmatic model of the Neutral versus arrogance. Barthes explains 
this aporia as follows: 
... all "planning" (thematic grouping) on the Neutral \vould fatally lead to an 
opposition between the Neutral and arrogance, that is, to reconstituting the very 
paradigm that the Neutral wants to baffle: the Neutral would become discursively 
the term of an antithesis: in displaying itself, it would consolidate the meaning it 
wanted to dissolve. (The Neutral 11-12: 37) 
In addition, according to Barthes, the affirmation of the Neutral leads to arrogance 
insomuch as the act of affirmation depends on the assertive function of language. 
Barthes does not say what the Neutral is so that he would be able to avoid the 
"definitional dogmatism" (dogJrtatisme definitionnel ) (The Neutral 45: 76). Indeed, at 
the beginning of his course, Barthes notes that he does not speak of the Neutral but 
rather "The Desire for Neutral" (Le Desir de Neutre) (The Neutral 1: 25). How can we 
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conceive any positive value of the Neutral without affirming it? 
In the face of this aporia,15 Barthes adopts what he calls the "principle of delicacy" 
(principe de delicatesse) as a way of describing the Neutral. The point is Marquis de 
Sade's discourse. The Marquise, having asked the imprisoned Marquis to hand his 
dirty linen to her, of course in order to wash it, Sade wants to see another motive of her 
request. It is that she wants his dirty linen itself. Sade says, "[cJharming creature, you 
want my dirty linen, myoId linen?" (The Neutral 29: 58) 'This motive is, of course, 
nonsense. However, Barthes detects in Sade's response the "principle of delicacy" (in 
the English version, jJrincipe de delicaiesse is translated as "principle of tact" because 
Sade's response is based on tact): 
Sade's very utterance exposes what the principle of tact is: a pleasure in analysis, 
a verbal operation that frustrates expectation (the laundry is dirty in order to be 
washed) and intimates that tact is a perversion that plays with the useless 
(nonfunctional) detail: the analysis generates minutiae ... and it's this cutting and 
rerouting that is the source of pleasure .... (The Neutral 29-30: 58-59) 
This principle of delicacy consists of baffling the expectation through playing with 
the useless detail. It can be called "perversion" (this is also a term of psychoanalysis as 
well as desire), which resists foreseeable reality. In this passage, "cutting" (decoupage) 
corresponds to the act of analysis, and "rerouting" (detournement) is linked to the 
suspension of expectation. The importance of the useless detail depends on the fact 
that it has no actual power, so that it is exempt from arrogance. In other words, 
Barthes (and Sade) can make use of the potential meaning even though it is imaginary 
or fantastic. In this way, the "principle of tact" serves as a way to demonstrate the 
Neutral. 
It seems that this function of potential elements offers a key to approach the Neutral 
as long as it maintains its specific status as the potential. We need therefore to consider 
the links between some figures of the Neutral and functions of potential elements. 
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Barthes writes of the figure of the androgyne as follows (English h-anslators adopt 
the "Neuter" for Ie Neutre as far as the third term between genders is concerned): 
... the Neuter, the Neuter about which we have spoken, the Neuter extended to 
discourse (to texts, to behaviors, to "motions") is not that of the Neither ... Nor, it's 
"both at once," "at the same time," or "that alternates with" ... And thus the 
Neuter is not what cancels the genders but what combines them, keeps them both 
present in the subject, at the same time, after each other, etc. -) Here, we open up 
into a great myth: the androgyne. (The Neutral 190-191: 239) 
The androgyne avoids the binary opposition in, for example, male/female. The 
process of this avoidance shows that the Neuter as the androgyne does not designate 
annihilation but combination of the difference between genders. Strictly speaking, this 
figure of the androgyne is not a dialectic of man and woman but a mixture of virility 
and femininity, since the status of the androgyne indicates the "merger [reunion] of 
virility and femininity insofar as it connotes union of contraries" (The Neutral 192: 
240). 
We can see, in Barthes's view on the androgyne, the relation based on categories, for 
a class "humans" includes both virility and femininity. In other words, three 
subcategories (androgyne, man, and woman) are subsumed into the upper class 
"humans." In this sense, we can say that this class "humans" serves as a certain 
archetype such as "archiphoneme" and "archi-vesteme." 
The most important point is that, whereas the androgyne as subcategory is present, 
the upper class "humans" remains potential. This category (the class "humans") is not 
absent but potential. Whether it emerges from the potential depends on our view (or 
attention). This class "humans" therefore avoids the binary opposition in terms of 
presence/absence. In other words, the abstract class as upper type is potential in the 
opposition between subcategories. As a result, in this case, the upper class "humans" 
conceptually transcends the binary opposition between man and woman. 
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Barthes's vision of paradigm, as we saw in the previous section, is closely associated 
with the model of one versus other (the presence or absence of a term). The potential is 
not reduced to the opposition between presence and absence. Thus, this characteristic 
of the potential helps to approach the Neutral. 
Let us demonstrate another example. In reference to Paul Valery's Monsieur Teste 
and Charles Baudelaire's Artificial Paradise, Barthes deliberately elaborates the notion 
of "hyperconsciousness" (hyperconscience). It is concerned with "intensity," that is to 
say the difference of degree that is difficult to be reduced to paradigmatic binary 
oppositions (for example the gradients of odor and luminosity). Moreover, this notion 
of "hyperconsciousness" generates the following paradox: 
... the combination of consciential [sic] hyperesthesia and emotivity, the sharp 
consciousness of the pathos seems to me to constitute an imaginary type (a 
formant [sic]): the self as imaginary, the unfailing coalescence of an affect and the 
awareness of it. ... (The Neutral 101: 138) 
This paradoxical status of hyperconsciousness ("the unfailing coalescence of an 
affect and the awareness of it") means that we can be simultaneously emotional and 
intellectual. In other words, we are able to perceive our emotional state clearly while we 
give ourselves over to our various emotions. Barthes calls this hyperconsciousness the 
"[c]onjunction of intellect and affect," "emotive hyperconsciousness," and "emotive 
lucidity" (The Neutral 101-102: 139-140). This combination of intellect and affect leads 
to the Neutral to the extent that it goes beyond the binary opposition in terms of 
intelligence/emotion. 
We can see here the relation based on categories mainly because the upper class as 
"the sensitive man" (l'homme sensible) (The Neutral 102: 140) includes two 
subcategories of man, namely the intellectual person and the emotional person. The 
abstract class offers an "imaginary type" of man. Moreover, we can say that this 
conceptual link between the upper class and its subcategories is potential in the sense 
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that the abstract class in question here, so to speak i11'lplicitly, transcends the binary 
opposition between the intellectual person and the emotional person. This function of 
generalization is not necessarily a truism (at least it needs our attention). 
This upper class "sensitive man" is visible in view of the fact that it is definitely 
noted by Barthes himself. In this sense, it seems that the upper class itself is present in 
front of us. Nevertheless, we can say that this abstract class is potential in the 
opposition bet\veen subcategories. In other words, the upper class cannot be situated at 
the same level of the semantic system as subcategories because we are \vell acquainted 
with the very difference of generality bet\veen the upper class and its subcategories. 
The upper class conceptually transcends the binary opposition between subcategories. 
5. Conclusion 
We have presented the two points that clarify the specificity of Barthes's concept of 
the Neutral. First, it rests on Barthes's own vision of the paradigm in which the 
difference between presence and absence is embodied as the relation of one versus 
other. \iVhat Barthes aspires to avoid is precisely the binary opposition in terms of 
presence/absence. Second, the conceptual link between the upper class and its 
subcategories (the relation between genre and espece) helps us focus on the potential 
aspect of the paradigm, which is not reduced to the presence/absence opposition. 
Barthes's concept of the Neutral seems to be inseparable from the potential dimension 
of language. 
The potential conceptually transcends the binary. Barthes's Neutral does not 
indicate the annihilation but rather the possibility of meaning. For instance, the 
androgyne that resists binary opposition not only deliberately avoids annihilating the 
difference between genders but also implicitly refers to another meaning, namely the 
upper class "humans." This function of generalization is, of course, founded on the 
relation of inclusion. 16 Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that Barthes's literary 
semiology reveals the conceptual link between the relation of inclusion and the 
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potential dimension of language. 
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